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The Android smartphone operating system includes a Java virtual machine that 
enables rapid development and deployment of a wide variety of applications. The 
open nature of the platform means that reverse engineering of applications is 
relatively easy, and many developers are concerned as applications similar to their 
own show up in the Android marketplace and want to know if these applications 
are pirated. Fortunately, the same characteristics that make an Android application 
easy to reverse engineer and copy also provide opportunities for Android 
developers to compare downloaded applications to their own. This paper 
describes the process for comparing a developer’s application with a downloaded 
application and defines an identifiability metric to quantify the degree to which an 
application can be identified by its bytecode. 
General Terms: Android, Bytecode, Decompiled Code, Identifiability Metric, 
Java, Software Copying, Software Forensics, Software Plagiarism, Source Code. 
Keywords: Android, BitMatch, Bytecode, CodeMatch, CodeSuite, Copying, 
Decompiling, Forensics, Identifiability, Intellectual Property, Java, Metrics, 
Plagiarism, Software, Source Code. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we describe how to compare an Android application’s source code 
with any downloaded Android application to find signs of copying. Many 
Android developers, and Android game developers in particular, are finding their 
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applications being pirated from the online Android Marketplace (Ciancarini & 
Favini, 2009; Hornshaw, 2011). 
We had a goal to define a comparison methodology and develop an 
“identifiability” metric to quantify how well a downloaded application could be 
identified from its bytecode. One purpose of the comparison is to determine 
whether a downloaded application was copied from another application, possibly 
leading to a copyright infringement charge. One purpose of the metric is to 
determine how much of an application’s identifying information can still be 
obtained after its source code has been compiled into bytecode. Identifiability can 
be a positive or negative characteristic. A program that is easily identifiable after 
compilation may be easier to detect when it has been pirated, even if it is 
subsequently modified. A program that is difficult to identify after compilation 
may hide more of its trade secrets from reverse engineering and theft. 
In this paper we present a case study that compares seven different Android 
Sudoku games applications and defines a measure called “identifiability” that 
represents how well the source code of an application can be identified by its 
compiled bytecode. 
2. THE COMPONENTS OF AN ANDROID APPLICATION 
Some programming languages, like the Java programming language, use a 
combination of compilers and interpreters. The Java compiler first turns the 
human-readable source code into intermediate code called “bytecode” that is a 
combination of computer-readable binary and human-readable text. A “Virtual 
Machine” (“VM”) is a kind of interpreter that reads the bytecode and instructs the 
computer to perform the appropriate instructions. Android applications consist of 
bytecode that is delivered in an Android Package file (APK), a compressed 
archive file. Once unpacked the contents of the APK include: 
 assets directory: This directory contains an unstructured hierarchy of files, 
defined by the app developer, for files that are retrievable as raw byte 
streams.  
 META-INF directory: This directory stores signature data that allows the 
application to verify that the APK download and expansion completed 
successfully. 
 res directory: This directory is used to store resource files for the 
application and includes information for the layout, names, and other 
elements used by the application. 
 AndroidManifest.xml file: This is a required file that contains the 
application name, version, access rights referenced library files, etc.  
 resources.arsc file: This is the binary resources file after compilation. 
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 classes.dex file: This is the Java bytecode file that will run on the Dalvik 
virtual machine used by Android and is not compatible with the typical 
Java virtual machine. 
To find signs of copying, the APK has two categories of files to examine: the non-
software source files (i.e. the AndroidManifest.xml file, the resource files, and the 
asset files) and the software bytecode (i.e. the classes.dex file).  
3. EXAMINING THE NON-SOFTWARE SOURCE FILES 
3.1 AndroidManifest.xml Files 
To extract the manifest file in a readable form, we used the apktool (Google Code, 
2011b) program. The extracted manifest file content is described in the Android 
developer documentation (Android Developers, 2012a): 
Among other things, the manifest does the following: 
 
 It names the Java package for the application. The package name 
serves as a unique identifier for the application. 
 It describes the components of the application—the activities, services, 
broadcast receivers, and content providers that the application is 
composed of. 
 It names the Java classes that implement each of the components and 
their capabilities. These declarations let the Android system know what 
the components are and under what conditions they can be launched. 
 It determines which processes will host application components. 
 It declares which permissions the application must have in order to 
access protected parts of the Android API and interact with other 
applications. 
 It declares the permissions that other applications are required to have 
in order to interact with the application's components. 
 It lists the Instrumentation classes that provide application code 
profiling and other information as the application is running. These 
declarations are present in the manifest only while the application is 
being developed and tested; they're removed before the application is 
published. 
 It declares the minimum level of the Android API that the application 
requires. 
 It lists the libraries to which the application must be linked. 
 
We visually inspected the manifest files of different applications to look for 
similarities. A utility like WinMerge or Diff can be used to find matches between 
two manifest files. We compared manifest files for different applications 
OpenSudoku (Google Code, 2011d)0 and Andoku (Google Code, 2011a) and no 
similarities were found. It is important to ignore similarities that are due to 
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requirements of Android or are similar for reasons other than copying, such as 
Android APIs (Software Analysis & Forensic Engineering Corp., 2012). 
3.2 Resource Files 
In addition to the manifest, a res directory of folders and files was also examined. 
These files are resource files in XML format. The Android Developer 
documentation describes the importance of using resources (Android Developers, 
2012b): 
You should always externalize resources such as images and strings 
from your application code, so that you can maintain them 
independently. Externalizing your resources also allows you to provide 
alternative resources that support specific device configurations such 
as different languages or screen sizes, which becomes increasingly 
important as more Android-powered devices become available with 
different configurations. In order to provide compatibility with 
different configurations, you must organize resources in your project's 
res/ directory, using various sub-directories that group resources by 
type and configuration. 
 
Altova’s DiffDog (Altova, 2012) utility made it easy to compare two res 
directories side by side. The tool automatically aligns directories with the same 
name and compares files with the same name. We compared resource files for the 
applications OpenSudoku and Andoku and no similarities were found. Again it is 
important to ignore similarities that are due to requirements of Android or are 
similar for reasons other than copying. 
3.3 Asset Files 
The assets directory contains a hierarchical directory of files used by the program. 
Asset files may be bitmapped images, HTML files, or any other type of file 
needed by the application. Not all applications have asset files. For the example 
applications, OpenSudoku had no asset files while Andoku did have asset files. 
4. COMPARISON METHODOLOGY AND MEASUREMENTS 
The bytecode for the application is found in the classes.dex file of the application 
APK. There are two approaches we considered for comparing the source code of 
one app to the bytecode of the downloaded app: 1) compare the bytecode form of 
the downloaded app or 2) decompile the bytecode into source code and compare 
the decompiled source code form of the downloaded app (Kalinovsky, 2004; 
Paller, 2009; Schulman, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c). We decided to try both 
approaches. 
Selecting a tool to perform the comparisons was the next step. 
4.1 Forensic Tool Selection 
Working from bytecode means some information from the original source code 
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will be lost, so a method to measure how much of the source code information is 
retained in the bytecode is important. A tool capable of examining bytecode is 
required. This requirement eliminated all but one of the forensic software analysis 
tools that are commercially available
1
. CodeSuite® by SAFE Corporation is the 
only tool that breaks down software into component elements and provides 
metrics on each of the component elements and thereby measures a baseline for 
source code coverage (Zeidman, 2006, 2008). It can also compare bytecode to 
source code (Software Analysis & Forensic Engineering Corp., 2011). 
4.2 Identifiability Metric 
We wanted a measure that signifies how easily application code can be identified 
after it has been compiled, because a goal of ours was to find out if a downloaded 
application was copied from the original application’s source code. Some source 
code elements such as identifiers and strings remain in bytecode after source code 
is compiled into bytecode, while other source code elements such as statements 
and comments are usually removed during compilation
2
. As a basis for an 
identifiability measure we wanted to determine the percentage of source code 
elements that remain in an application’s bytecode. We also wanted to decompile 
bytecode back into source code and again determine the percentage of the source 
code elements from the original source code that can be found in the resulting 
decompiled source code. 
4.2.1 Source code element metrics 
Bob Zeidman previously defined a process for examining source code to find 
copying that can be boiled down to: divide source code into basic elements, find 
all matches between elements of different programs, and then filter out matches 
that are not caused by copying (Zeidman, 2011). Based on this information, two 
measures for the source code elements were taken, the first is how many total 
elements exist and the second is how many of those elements are uncommon. 
Uncommon elements are more helpful at determining the identifiability of the 
application. Finding these uncommon elements in two different programs is a 
strong indicator that one may have been copied from the other (Zeidman, 2006, 
2008, 2011). 
Obtaining these metrics for an application involves running two CodeSuite tools. 
A CodeMatch® comparison of the application’s source code to itself gives a list 
of all source code elements in the application. There are three types of elements 
that we consider: comments and strings (str), identifiers (id), and statements 
(stmt). The total number of source code elements of each type in a particular 
                                                 
11 Note that we required a software forensics tool not a digital forensics tool. Our analysis is not 
about recovering data or determining the kind of data, but rather understanding the content of 
the data. CodeSuite is one of the few tools that analyze software on this level. See The Software 
IP Detective’s Handbook (Zeidman, 2011), Chapter 9, for further clarification. 
2 A limitation of CodeMatch is that it lumps strings and comments together. For determining 
identifiability it would be better to consider these two source code elements separately. 
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application is represented as SE(str), SE(id), and SE(stmt). Running 
SourceDetective® then determines the number of times each source code element 
could be found on the Internet (“hits”). The Internet search hit count h is used to 
qualify the counts. In Table 1, these totals returned from CodeMatch and 
SourceDetective for the Android game OpenSudoku are shown. The numbers are 
taken from spreadsheets generated by CodeSuite. In this case, elements with less 
than 25 hits were considered uncommon and good potential indicators of copying, 
and elements with 0 hits were considered unique. Future researchers may want to 
test a different threshold than 25 hits for labeling a source code element as 
uncommon, but this number worked well in these tests and in our experience. 
Obviously an element that cannot be found elsewhere through an Internet search 
(i.e., has 0 hits) is unique to that application. 
 












5,913 1,015 1,647 3,251 
Uncommon  
(h < 25 hits) (SE25) 
3,599 684 431 2,484 
Unique  
(h = 0 hits) (SE0) 
3,171 621 324 2,226 
Table 1: CodeMatch analysis results of OpenSudoku source 
 
4.2.2 Baseline for comparing bytecode 
Next another CodeSuite tool, BitMatch®, was run to compare the application’s 
source code with its own bytecode file (classes.dex). Then SourceDetective was 
run to generate the report of hits. This information is needed to create a baseline to 
quantify our likelihood of identifying copied code because we cannot expect 
better results comparing one application’s bytecode to another application’s 
source code (or bytecode) than when comparing one application’s bytecode to its 
own source code.  
Because CodeSuite provides these metrics by element type, it is valuable to define 
the identifiability metric by type as well as defining the total identifiability. There 
are three types of elements that we consider: comments and strings (str), 
identifiers (id), and statements (stmt)
3
. The number of source code elements that 
are also found in the application’s bytecode are represented as BE(str), BE(id), 
and BE(stmt). The bytecode identifiability IB is the number of elements that can 
                                                 
3 CodeMatch lumps comments and string together. Comments cannot be found in bytecode, so 
we refer to them simply as strings. Also, BitMatch extracts some text that it cannot determine to 
be strings or identifiers and so considers them to be both. 
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be found in the application’s bytecode as a percentage of the total number of those 
elements in the application’s source code. The Internet search hit count h is then 
used to qualify both the element (BEh) and total (SEh) counts so that identifiability 
can be determined for elements with h or fewer hits. Source code elements with 
high hit counts do not help uniquely identify an application while those with low 
hit counts do. 
The formulas for calculating the identifiability of an application’s bytecode are: 
IBh(str) = BEh(str)/SEh(str) 
IBh(id) = BEh(id)/SEh(id) 
IBh(stmt) = BEh(stmt)/SEh(stmt) 
IBh= (BEh(str)+BEh(id)+BEh(stmt))/(SEh(str)+SEh(id)+SEh(stmt)) 
Table 2 shows the results for the analysis of the bytecode for the Android game 
OpenSudoku. As expected, because the bytecode does not include statements or 
comments from the source, the identifiability for statements was 0 and the 
comment/string identifiability comes only from strings. However, the 
identifiability for identifiers was high, which means that if code was copied, the 
comparison of bytecode with source code is very likely to find the copying 
(unless all of the identifiers were subsequently renamed). In addition, the 
coverage of unique identifiers (~90%) means that the compiling and packaging 
process did not eliminate many unique identifiers. 
 
BitMatch Metrics Total  String(str) Identifier(id) 
Elements (BE) 1,513 227 1,286 
Identifiability (IB) 25.6% 22.4% 78.1% 
Uncommon matches (BE25) 443 44 399 
Uncommon identifiability (IB25) 12.3% 6.4% 92.6% 
Unique matches (BE0) 326 34 292 
Unique identifiability (IB0) 10.3% 5.5% 90.1% 
Table 2: BitMatch analysis results of comparison of OpenSudoku's classes.dex 
with its source code 
4.2.3 Baseline for comparing decompiled source with original source 
We can measure the identifiability of the decompiled bytecode using the same 
methodology by comparing the application’s source code to the source code 
from its decompiled bytecode. 
4.2.3.1 Converting classes.dex to a JAR file 
To get source code from the bytecode dex file requires decompiling. The JD-GUI 
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decompiler (Java Decompiler, 2012) was selected (see section 0 for more 
information on the decompiler selection process). The decompiler works with 
either a Java archive (JAR) file or bytecode class files. The free dex2jar utility 
(Google Code, 2011c) was used to generate a JAR file from the classes.dex file. 
4.2.3.2 Decompiling a JAR file 
CodeMatch was used to compare the application’s original source code with its 
decompiled source code. Then SourceDetective was run and decompiled code 
identifiability metrics were calculated. The number of source code elements that 
are also found in the application’s decompiled bytecode are represented as 
DE(str), DE(id), and DE(stmt). The identifiability ID is the number of elements 
that can be found in the application’s decompiled bytecode as a percentage of the 
total number of those elements in the application’s original source code. The 
Internet search hit count h is then used to qualify both the element (DEh) and total 
(SEh) counts so that identifiability can be determined for elements with h or fewer 
hits. Source code elements with high hit counts do not help uniquely identify an 
application while those with low hit counts do. 
The formulas for calculating the identifiability of an application’s decompiled 
bytecode are: 
IDh(str) = DEh(str)/SEh(str) 
IDh(id) = DEh(id)/SEh(id) 
IDh(stmt) = DEh(stmt)/SEh(stmt) 
IDh = (DEh(str)+DEh(id)+DEh(stmt))/(SEh(str)+SEh(id)+SEh(stmt)) 
 






Elements (SE) 1,831 134 1,267 430 
Total Identifiability (ID) 31.0% 13.2% 76.9% 13.2% 
Uncommon matches (SE25) 697 52 393 252 
Uncommon Identifiability 
(ID25) 
19.4% 7.6% 91.2% 10.1% 
Unique matches (SE0) 572 43 304 225 
Unique Identifiability (ID0) 18.0% 6.9% 93.8% 10.1% 
Table 3: CodeMatch analysis results comparing OpenSudoku decompiled 
source code with its original source code 
5. DECOMPILING ANDROID APPLICATIONS 
Based on the results above it is clear the decompiler did not fully recreate the 
source code, so we wondered how good is the decompiled code? Table 4 shows 
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the results of compiling the source code generated by the JD-GUI decompiler for 
three different applications. These results illustrate that the decompile process 
often does not produce source code that can be compiled or executed. 
 
App Compiles? Executes? 
Hello World Yes Yes 
Notepadv1 No  No 
OpenSudoku No No 
Table 4: Validate JD-GUI decompiled code by attempting to compile and run 
Because the decompiled code from JD-GUI does not compile, it made sense to 
look at other Java decompilers. The JAD decompiler (Varaneckas, 2001), another 
popular open source Java decompiler, was also tested using the same three 
applications. The results are shown in Table 5. 
 
App Compiles? Executes? 
Hello World Yes Yes 
Notepadv1 No (warning class file version 50 not 
supported, but generated Java files) 
No 
OpenSudoku No (errors and crashed decompiling 
CommandStack.class) 
No 
Table 5: Validate JAD decompiled code by attempting to compile and run 
Based on this testing, while the JD-GUI decompiler didn’t produce compilable 
code, it was selected because it was able to decompile all of the test cases while 
JAD failed to generate code in 2 out of the 3 cases tested.  
Is decompiling a useful technique for identifying copying when source code is 
unavailable? The surprising result seen in Table 3 is that decompiling did improve 
the total identifiability. Comparing an application’s source code with the source 
code that is decompiled from a suspect application’s bytecode appears to be a 
slightly better way to detect copying than to directly compare an application’s 
source code to a suspect application’s bytecode. This is because bytecode 
decompilation produces source code statements that can then be compared, 
increasing the identifiability. And in general, being able to view source code will 
give you a better understanding of the context of any matching source code 
elements. The case study below can better illustrate how decompiling helps. 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 7(1) 
64 
6. CASE STUDY: COMPARING DIFFERENT ANDROID SUDOKU 
APPLICATIONS 
To illustrate the comparison methodology, we selected a variety of Android 




 Enjoy Sudoku 
 Mobile Sudoku 
 Standard Sudoku 
 Sudoku UI 
Each of these was compared with OpenSudoku, the application used in the source 
code element coverage measures (see Section 0). 
6.1 Bytecode to Source Code Comparison 
The table below details the number of source code element matches found when 
comparing an application’s bytecode with OpenSudoku’s application source code. 
Table 6 identifies application Andoku as having uncommon string and identifier 
matches with application OpenSudoku. The matched elements are listed in the 
CodeSuite report and shown in Table 7. 
Because these elements are not commonly used—based upon Internet searches—
the next step is to identify where they occur in the OpenSudoku application 
source code and how they are used. Searching the OpenSudoku source files for all 
occurrences of the elements shows that the matches occur in important files or 
code segments. 
 













Andoku 329 22 / 1 / 0 325 / 4 / 1 
Sudoku_bomb 227 6 / 0 / 0 226 / 0 / 0 
EnjoySudoku 387 14 / 0 / 0 384 / 0 / 0 
Mobile37Sudoku 182 5 / 0 / 0 180 / 0 / 0 
StandardSudoku 266 14 / 0 / 0 264 / 0 / 0 
Sudoku.ui 204 12 / 0 / 0 202 / 0 / 0 
Table 6: BitMatch results for app bytecode to OpenSudoku source code 
 
Matching program elements Search hits 
Strings  






Table 7: OpenSudoku to Andoku uncommon matches 
The string “bad menuInfo” is used in the OpenSudoku source code for error 
messaging. 
The identifier “DIALOG_RESET_PUZZLE” is used in the OpenSudoku source 
code in a switch statement that controls the appearance of different dialogs based 
on a user’s action.  
The identifier “EXTRA_FOLDER_ID” is found fifteen times in five different 
OpenSudoku source code files, all within the GUI. 
This collection of information provides compelling evidence of possible copying 
between Andoku and OpenSudoku because it identifies matches in a number of 
different code files. Next the decompiled code is used to provide more context to 
this possible copying. 
                                                 
4 Note that the total elements is less than the sum of string elements and identifier elements due 
to some elements being in both categories because BitMatch cannot be certain whether a single 
word is an identifier or string. 
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6.2 Decompiled Bytecode to Source Code Comparison 
Table 8 shows the decompiled code results for all the applications. The analysis 
identifies Andoku with uncommon element matches. 
 














Andoku 468 10 / 1 / 0 376 / 5 / 1 82 / 1 / 0 
Sudoku_bomb 300 2 / 0 / 0 247 / 0 / 0 51 / 1 /0 
EnjoySudoku 417 3 / 0 / 0 337 / 0 / 0 77 / 1 / 0 
Mobile37Sudoku 287 4 / 0 / 0 224 / 0 / 0 59 / 0 / 0 
StandardSudoku 294 2 / 0 / 0 240 / 0 / 0 52 / 0 / 0 
Sudoku.ui 363 7 / 0 / 0 296 / 0 / 0 60 / 1 / 0 
Table 8: CodeMatch results for comparing OpenSudoku source code to 
decompiled source code 
In Table 9, the uncommon matches found between the Andoku decompiled byte 
code and OpenSudoku source code are listed. 
 
Matching program elements Search hits 
Strings  








Import android.widget.SimpleCursorAdapter.ViewBinder 22 
Table 9: Uncommon matches between OpenSudoku and Andoku 
A comparison of OpenSudoku source code with Andoku decompiled source code 
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was performed. Even though close examination of the decompiled code revealed 
a functional error that would prevent the code from executing, the string “bad 
menuInfo” matched, the file name matched, the class name matched, and the 
method name matched, indicating that these two code segments have significant 
similarity. 
We downloaded the actual Andoku source code (Google Code, 2011a) and found 
it to be nearly identical to the OpenSudoku source, thereby validating what our 
code analysis had flagged. 
The other matched items from Table 9 also identified segments of code with 
copying. The additional information that the decompiled code provided gave 
context to the matched elements, offering more compelling evidence of copying. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we defined an identifiability metric for a software application that 
can give a developer an idea of how easy or difficult it is to identify bytecode as 
being derived from an application’s source code. A high identifiability means it 
will be easier to detect that another application was derived from or copied from 
the application. A low identifiability means that an application's trade secrets are 
better hidden. 
In this paper, the viability of analyzing Android applications to discover possible 
copyright infringement without access to source code is demonstrated. The code 
comparison techniques identified uncommon element matches, offering 
developers an effective solution to identify code copying. The surprising result 
was that it was slightly more effective to use decompiled bytecode rather than 
bytecode in the comparison. It seems that decompiling puts information back into 
the code that is in the bytecode but difficult to identify. 
While any evidence uncovered without access to source code may be compelling 
enough to convince a judge that there is reason for litigation, gaining access to 
source is ultimately needed to prove the extent of the copying. Because the 
techniques demonstrated apply to code that has been compiled and information 
has thus been removed, they do not cover 100% of the source code elements, and 
thus not finding any uncommon element matches does not disprove copying. 
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